It has been nearly four months since Ruben Amorim arrived at Manchester United and his record in all competitions reads as follows: played 22, won nine, drawn four, and lost nine.
It is fair to say things have not fully gone to plan, but digging into the underlying numbers can often help reveal any trends related to wider team performance.
This week's game against Ipswich Town provides an opportune moment to reflect given Kieran McKenna's side were the first opponents Amorim faced as the new United boss, back in November.
So, what is the assessment so far? Are there signs of light at the end of the tunnel? How does the 40-year-old's early tenure compare with the start of the season under Erik ten Hag?
Three of The Athletic's data and tactics writers, Mark Carey, Anantaajith Raghuraman and Conor O'Neill, discuss some of the key on-pitch talking points that are swirling around Old Trafford at the moment.
Carey: A look at Manchester United's numbers in both boxes paints a confusing picture.
Despite their blunt attack under Amorim, United's rate of goals per 90 has actually improved compared with the early season output under Erik ten Hag. The kicker is that the underlying data reveals how little the needle has moved in attack.
If anything, it has gone backwards. Lower expected goals (xG) and fewer shots -- of lower quality -- show that Amorim still has work to do to instil repeatable attacking patterns that United can profit from.
Things are pretty much unchanged at the other end, with no discernible difference in United's defensive numbers since Amorim arrived.
His back-three system was designed to add greater protection and provide a stronger foundation for United to build from. That is yet to materialise.
Combine those expected goals figures across a rolling 10-game average and it only serves to reinforce how muddled things are at both ends of the pitch.
Raghuraman: In possession, there are subtle differences in United's approach under Ten Hag and Amorim. Their direct speed (defined as the distance the ball is advanced towards the opposition goal in meters per second) has dropped from 1.1 under Ten Hag to 0.9 under Amorim, and their direct attacks per 90 has marginally increased from 2.6 to 2.7.
But while profligacy was the bigger issue under their previous manager, chance creation has taken over that mantle under Amorim. United's 9.5 chances created per 90 since Amorim's arrival is well short of the 11.7 under Ten Hag. Even the 2023-24 United side, roundly slated for its poor performance in front of goal, averaged 11.5 chances created per 90.
A lack of sufficient time on the training ground and the non-suitability of profiles are contributors, but there is also a repeated absence of on-pitch initiative. This was evident over the weekend against Everton, when it took a Bruno Fernandes free kick to spark United into life after a pedestrian first 70 minutes that saw them generate an xG of just 0.04.
The issues seem to arise early in the build-up phase, starting with goalkeeper Andre Onana. United are yet to see the best of his distribution -- the primary reason they brought him in from Inter -- though there have been glimpses. Under both Ten Hag and Amorim this season, Onana has often gone long, especially from goal kicks, as the graph below shows.
This could be due to concerns over the centre-backs carrying the ball forward. While Harry Maguire and Lisandro Martinez are certainly capable of doing so, neither have the pace to cover large spaces. Conversely, Leny Yoro has that pace, but his ball-carrying is a work in progress.
There seems to be an active ploy to hit the left wing. Under Amorim, United's forwards tend to group up against the opposition defence on that flank, with Fernandes and the left wing-back moving high up to provide further options. But United have struggled to dominate opponents in such scenarios and consistently fail to win second balls. When they do win the ball, they have been unable to execute the kind of defence-stretching switches that Amorim's Sporting CP side frequently used.
Onana has at times opted to go centrally towards Rasmus Hojlund or Joshua Zirkzee, much to the frustration of his team-mates, as seen below in the 3-1 home defeat to Brighton last month.
There is plenty to mull over for Amorim, but in-possession play is arguably the most noticeable for fans and stakeholders alike. So far, United have struggled to find a balance between patient and direct build-up play, resulting in fewer productive periods of possession, leading us into...
Carey: Is it too obvious to answer by saying that they simply are not turning enough of their time on the ball into attacking opportunities?
The numbers bear this out. When looking at the share of possessions that end in a shot, this was at 45 per cent under Ten Hag. Under Amorim, this has dipped slightly to 41 per cent, so there is no evidence to suggest they look any more potent going forward.
Amad (now injured) has been one of the team's brightest lights in recent months, but service to United's central striker is still lacking. Among forwards with 900-plus minutes in the Premier League, Joshua Zirkzee's two shots per 90 is good enough for 36th on the list of 58 players. Hojlund's 1.2 non-penalty shots per 90 is 55th on that list, which goes a long way to telling you the story.
It has been a long-running narrative, but Hojlund is simply not being found enough in the attacking third. We have seen it so many times when he has been screaming for the ball and cuts a frustrated figure when his team-mate doesn't make the pass even when he is in a good position.
Looking at his passes received in the Premier League, Bruno Fernandes has found Hojlund the most -- but it is quite telling that Lisandro Martinez, Noussair Mazraoui and Onana have passed to Hojlund more than Amad, Alejandro Garnacho and Kobbie Mainoo this season.
It will be unsurprising for United fans, but the team still doesn't have a coherent attacking unit that maximises the strengths of the centre-forwards they have. They are taking 13.1 non-penalty shots per 90 this season -- the 12th-highest rate in the league. As much as you can look at individuals, it is Amorim's job to build some attacking patterns that get the ball in repeatable areas of the pitch and sharpen things at the top end.
O'Neill: The lack of service to Hojlund is certainly striking, but I see it as a two-way issue -- does he do enough to command a greater share of possession? While Amorim's system is characterised by patient build-up, his teams are also encouraged to play direct when necessary -- around 10 per cent of United's passes have been long balls.
When the ball is launched, the striker is expected to hold up the ball and link play efficiently through quick combinations with the supporting attackers. Despite him being 6ft 2in (188cm), Hojlund has struggled with the target man responsibilities his role demands. He has won just 22 per cent of his aerial duels -- the lowest of any striker to play at least 900 minutes this season.
Data from Footovision further highlights his lack of involvement. Among Premier League strikers who have started over half of their team's matches, Hojlund is involved in just 1.3 per cent of United's creative phases, underscoring his peripheral role in build-up play.
Hojlund is not currently blessed with a potent creative supply line, but for Amorim's attacking unit to thrive, he surely needs to give more to get more.
Raghuraman: An equally pressing issue seems to be the lack of alternatives to Hojlund. Amorim notably used Marcus Rashford as the No 9 in his first match as United boss -- against Ipswich Town -- with Rashford scoring in the first minute. That is no longer an option.
Joshua Zirkzee has faced similar struggles to Hojlund and by his own admission is not an out-and-out centre-forward. Zirkzee's best moments have come in the No 10 role when allowed the time to operate in the half-spaces.
The Dutchman does not have the channel-running abilities or physicality Amorim typically needs from his No 9, while Hojlund, despite having those qualities, is struggling to contribute to United's attack during a prolonged lean spell, as Conor pointed out.
Carey: Everyone knew what they were going to get from Amorim. Changing this early on in his tenure would not only make little sense, but it would undermine the reason United brought him to the club in the first place.
It is also worth noting that formations can be quite reductionist in their meaning. When considering United's approach across different phases of play, there are obvious deviations in the shape of the team -- which Amorim has been quick to explain.
"Playing with three is more or less the same thing as playing with four," Amorim said after a 2-0 defeat to Newcastle United. "We can change the characteristics. If we play with Amad on the wing, it could be a little bit different.
"We had some games where we were pressing 4-4-2, so I don't see it that way. Of course, I didn't choose the players specifically for that position -- but that I already knew. But I have to sell my idea, (so) if I'm going to change all the time, it is going to be even worse. But I understand they have a lot of difficulties because they spent two years playing one way and then they are (now) playing another."
Discussions around the efficacy of Amorim's 3-4-2-1 shape will be more justified this time next year, but the issue at the moment is not the system -- it's having the time and players to implement it.
O'Neill: I think it's important to acknowledge that 15 games is still a relatively small sample size and that much of this period has been about Amorim refining his best starting line-up. Add to that long-term injuries to key players Lisandro Martinez, Mason Mount, and Amad, plus a January transfer window, and Amorim has yet to work with a consistent pool of players.
Against Everton, he made just one change to the starting line-up -- the least he has rotated during his 15 league games so far.
A familiar line-up will help United adapt to Amorim's unfamiliar approach. The sooner that comes, the better for all involved.